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RICHARD SIGGARD, 
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W. PARKER EARL, BETTY ANN EARL, 
WILLIAM R. LANG and SUSAN L. : 
LANG, 
Defendants and : 
Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT RICHARD SIGGARD 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
We respectfully submit that the cross motions for summary judgment raise the same 
issue: 
Should summary judgment be granted to the party (Mr. Siggard) whose 
motion is supported by depositions and affidavits, if he is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, when the other parties' (Messrs. Earl and Langs') motion is 
not supported by anything but their pleadings? 
The pertinent standards for appellate review are the following: 
1. The reviewing court will review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment was granted. Larson v. Wycoff Co., 
624P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981). 
2. The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a 
directed verdict. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265, 
106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). 
3. Where a party submits no documents in opposition to summary judgment, the 
moving party may be granted summary judgment, if he is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INVOLVED 
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ P., provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * 
Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Richard Siggard, initiated this lawsuit in January 1990, as the seller 
under a uniform real estate contract entered into in September 1978, hereafter "first 
contract," to assert the remedy of foreclosure under the contract when the annual payment 
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due July 10, 1989, was not paid. 
Messrs. Earl and Lang filed an amended counterclaim involving the first contract and 
two additional uniform real estate contracts entered into in December 1978. As to each of 
the three contracts1 Messrs. Earl and Lang asked that the stipulation in each contract for 
liquidated damages—reducing the purchase price of each of the contracts by $600 per 
acre—because culinary water was not provided to the parcels of land involved by July 1, 
1989. 
The case was presented to the district court on cross motions for summary judgment 
on all issues except that Mr. Siggard reserved the issue of attorney fees. 
The district court refused to foreclose the first contract and denied Mr. Siggard's 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
The district court granted Messrs. Earl and Lang's motion for summary judgment and, 
in doing so, (1) applied the liquidated damages, stipulation in the contracts to recalculate the 
remaining principal and interest balance of each contract and (2) ordered Mr. Siggard to 
secure the release of the three parcels from the obligations of a contract which he (and his 
deceased wife) entered into in 1977 with Mr. and Mrs. Prescott, hereafter the "Prescott 
contract," under which the Siggards purchased the three parcels and other lands, some 240 
acres in all. (R. 265; Appendix.) The Prescott contract has not yet been fully executed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
None of the following facts has been contradicted by Messrs. Earl and Lang. The 
Each of the three contracts was made on a printed uniform real estate contract form. 
(R. 259, 261, 263.) 
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facts are presented under the two issues raised by the judgment below. 
Reduction of purchase price for nondelivery of water 
In 1977 Richard Siggard and his wife acquired the right, by the Prescott contract, to 
purchase some 240 acres of land near the town of Francis in Summit County, Utah. (R. 265; 
deposition of Richard Siggard, pp. 7, 9.) The land is situated approximately 6V2 miles 
northeast of the Jordanelle reservoir now under construction near Heber City, Utah. 
On June 5, 1978, Mr. Siggard and his wife entered into the first contract (R. 259) 
with Messrs. Earl and Lang (and their wives) to sell them a 20 acre parcel from the 240 acres 
of land the Siggards were buying under the Prescott contract. In December 1978 the parties 
entered into a second contract for another parcel of 20 acres, a third contract for a parcel of 
10 acres and a fourth contract for a parcel of 10 acres, all from the land under the Prescott 
contract. (R. 261, 263.)2 
The first contract calls for an annual payment of $6,000; the second contract calls for 
an annual payment of $3,750; and the third contract calls for an annual payment of $1,650. 
The payments are to be made on July 10 of each year until the contracts are paid in full. 
Each of the three contracts required the Siggards, as the sellers, to provide culinary 
water to the parcels within four years from the dates of the contracts. The earliest time to 
provide water would be in June 1982 under the first contract. The parties stipulated to a 
2
 The fourth contract is not involved in this case and is not one of the exhibits. Mention 
of the parcel of land in the fourth contract as Mr. Earl's "Keogh property" is found in some 
of the correspondence involved in this lawsuit The fourth parcel was released by the 
Prescotts and conveyed by Mr. Siggard to Mr. Earl, after payment in full, in November 
1983. 
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reduction of the purchase price of each contract by $600 per acre if water should not be 
provided. The pertinent language in the first contract reads as follows (the second and third 
contracts contain substantially the same language) (R. 259): 
Culinary water will be provided to the property within four 
years by the Seller or the total purchase price shall be reduced 
by $600.00 per acre. 
The parties' contracts were prepared by a title company in Heber City, Utah, and 
reflected the parties' entire agreement, as of 1978, with respect to the delivery of water. 
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 10-11, 15-16.) 
Messrs. Earl and Lang had no immediate intention of doing anything with the parcels 
in 1978. They were planning for commercial use and for subdivisions of the parcels when a 
market for the land would open up with the completion of the Jordanelle Reservoir. There 
was no particular reason for the four year deadline in which to provide water to the parcels. 
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 9, 11, 13, 18; deposition of William R. Lang, p. 7.) 
The contracts contained none of the "criteria" and "conditions" that were later asserted 
by Messrs. Earl and Lang in 1988-89 as to the quantity of water to be provided and as to the 
location of the distribution lines for the water. 
In 1982, before the time for providing water to the first parcel had arrived, the 
savings in principal payments to Messrs. Earl and Lang from a reduction of the purchase 
price of each of the three contracts—covering a total of 50 acres—would have been $30,000 
(50 acres x $600). The savings in interest calculated from 1982 over the remaining life of 
the contracts, at the contract rate of SVi%9 would have been approximately $27,600. 
Before the time for providing water in 1982, Messrs. Earl and Lang told Mr. Siggard 
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that they preferred to have water delivered in the future rather than take the $600 per acre 
reduction of the purchase price of each of the three parcels. The date for providing water 
was extended to June 1983. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 2 (R. 255).) The 
extensions were later confirmed by letter in December 1982. (R. 276.) Mr. Siggard did not 
provide water to the parcels in 1982 because as explained by him, in his deposition (p. 22): 
they [Messrs. Earl and Lang] said they didn't need it at this time, and it 
was a situation in which if I put it in it would be sitting for a long 
period of time. 
In the summer of 1983 Mr. Siggard completed a successful well to provide 
water for the three parcels. The well was drilled to a depth of 135 feet, an 8" casing was 
installed, and the well was capped and sealed to protect the casing from oxidation. The well 
produced 80-100 gallons of water per minute. (Deposition of Richard Siggard, pp. 25, 35; 
first affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 3 (R. 255).) 
After the well was completed, Mr. Siggard explained to Messrs. Earl and Lang the 
reason for not laying the distribution lines from the well to their parcels at that time. (First 
affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 3 (R. 255.) He repeated the explanation in his deposition (pp. 
26-27, 35): 
I explained to Parker Earl and Bill Lang that unless they had a need for 
that water, if that casing was unsealed and even if a pump was put on it 
that it would deteriorate within a year and a half, be completely 
destroyed. 
Also in 1983, the parties agreed that in the future water should be provided to the 
parcels when necessary or actually needed, rather than on a date certain. Mr. Siggard stated, 
in his first affidavit (R. 255): 
4. The three of us agreed that bringing water to the lots 
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would be postponed until the water was actually needed. 
This modified agreement was confirmed in an exchange of letters in 1987. The first 
letter, from Messrs. Earl and Lang, dated July 1, 1987, states the agreement as follows (R. 
278): 
Bill and I would also appreciate it if you would direct a letter to 
our attention indicating in writing that since June 27, 1983, which was 
the deadline for delivery of the water, that you understand we have 
given you an extension on that until at such time it may be necessary or 
we need to have water to the property. Would you please indicate in 
writing your commitment to us on the 10 acres under my Keogh [not 
involved in this lawsuit], the 10 acres north of my Keogh, the 20 acres 
south of Mr. Toome's home and the 20 acres on the corner of Foothill 
and Page. 
Mr. Siggard responded by letter on July 8, 1987, in which he said (R. 279): 
It is agreed by the undersigned, Richard Siggard, that when Culinary water is 
actually needed it would brought to the property. 
A year later, in a letter of June 6, 1988 (R. 280), Messrs. Earl and Lang again 
confirmed the agreement for providing water when "actually needed." They also told Mr. 
Siggard that there was a "specific need" for water on the third (10 acre) parcel which Earl 
and Lang had subcontracted to sell to a Mr. and Mrs. Clark. As it later developed, the sale 
to the Clark's was not completed because of their divorce. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, 
pp. 18-19, 29, 39.) 
In the third paragraph of their June 6, 1988, letter, Messrs. Earl and Lang laid down 
several "criteria" as being "necessary for us to accept the delivery of water" (R.280): 
For clarification, if you choose to bring the water, the following criteria 
are necessary for us to accept the delivery of water as provided in the 
contract: 
1. The amount of culinary water needed will be 1 acre foot per 
7 
year per family, which is considered the standard. The number 
of families is based on the zoning, which we interpret to be one 
family for every 100 feet of frontage on a county road. 
2. The size pump, storage tank, and pipe shall be sufficient to 
provide that water. 
3. The waterline to the North should be located along the county 
road within the required front yard setback, avoiding as many 
trees a^  possible. We should coordinate on specific location. 
4. Although we are requesting a decision in writing by July 1, 
1988, should you elect to deliver culinary water, the water will 
not be required to be delivered by July 1, 1988. However, the 
water system has to be built and capable of delivering the supply 
of water requested above by July 1, 1989. 
The three contracts, as prepared in 1978 (R. 259, 261, 263), contained nothing with 
respect to the number of families to be served (one every 100 feet) and the location of water 
lines. Mr. Siggard did not agree with the "criteria" but said, by letter of June 23, 1988, that 
he would meet the requirement of the contracts (R. 212): 
Apparently the time has come for the seller, my wife has passed 
away, to comply with the contracts and provide culinary water to the 
properties involved. As the Seller it is my to meet this requirement of 
the contracts and as you have requested by July 1, 1989. The routing 
of the water lines to your property has already been discussed with both 
of you in the past. 
Some time in the first half of 1989, Messrs. Earl and Lang had approached Summit 
County for zoning changes for the three lots. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 55.) They 
learned that they might not be able to have their lots subdivided and might not be able to sell 
as many parcels as they had intended. It also appears to have been about the same time that 
they decided that the three lots could be sold without water. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, 
pp. 63-64.) 
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In a letter of March 1, 1989, Messrs. Earl and Lang withdrew the "criteria" as to the 
number of families to be served but told Mr. Siggard that they would not accept water unless 
he met the following "conditions," none of which were part of the original contracts (R. 
281): 
In order to accept culinary water in lieu of the reduction of 
$600/acre on our 60 acres as per the contracts between us, we will 
require that the following conditions be met: 
1. One pipe be run north from the well to the south property 
line of the north 10 acre contract (Parker's Keogh north line) on the 
east side of the Beaver and Shingle Creek canal in an easement 
mutually agreeable with Mr. Earl. The water line shall conform to 
present Summit County requirements for culinary water line 
construction. Another pipe be run across the road from the well to our 
corner 20 acres. Another from the well to our south 20 acres. 
2. That the capacity of the well, pump and culinary water 
storage tank be sufficient to supply four (4) dwelling units, one on each 
parcel as per current State and County Board of Health,and Planning 
and Zoning requirements as to quantity, quality and fire protection. 
3. Transfer to us of water ownership for the required acre feet 
involved (as per Summit Co. Planning and Zoning requirements) to 
protect future landowner interests.3 
According to Mr. Earl, Mr. Siggard's work on the water project in June 1989 was 
"aggressive." (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 89.) In the month of June, however, Mr. 
Siggard received oral instructions that he not install the pipe for the water lines before there 
was a discussion as to where the lines would be located. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 
3
 The escrow accounts for the three contracts provide that the water company shares 
placed in escrow would be delivered upon payment of the contracts. (First affidavit of 
Richard Siggard, 1 8 (R. 255)). 
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42, 48, 49, 89, 91, 93 and 94.) The oral instructions were confirmed by letter from Messrs. 
Earl and Lang dated June 12, 1989, in which the following was stated (R. 283): 
Dick the time is quickly upon us and we are concerned that it could be 
initiated without our review, so please do not install the pipe before we 
all review your plans. * * * 
But for the instructions not to install pipe, Mr. Siggard would have taken water to the 
parcels, believing that there was a need for water. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard, t 5 
(R. 255); second affidavit, 1 2 (R. 293).) 
On June 22, 1989, Mr. Siggard wrote to Messrs. Earl and Lang that he would be 
able to get a copy of a water system drawing to them in a few days. (R. 216.) The drawing 
was sent to them by letter of July 11, 1989. (R. 220.) Mr. Siggard's plans were not 
reviewed by Messrs. Earl and Lang. They chose, instead, to not speak to Mr. Siggard about 
the drawing he sent them and the location of the distribution lines because the drawing was 
received after July 1. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 94-95.) 
Depositions disclosed that there never was an actual need for water, apart from the 
anticipated need of the Clarks, which need evaporated when they withdrew from their 
contract with Messrs. Earl and Lang, because of their divorce. There were no other potential 
buyers for any of the three parcels in 1988 or 1989. In all the years from 1978 to 1989, 
Messrs. Earl and Lang lost no offers to buy land for lack of water. (Deposition of W. 
Parker Earl, pp. 18-19, 29, 39, 55; deposition of William R. Lang, pp. 7-8.) 
There is no evidence of pecuniary loss or damage suffered by Messrs. Earl and Lang 
at any time. There is no evidence of culpable delinquency on the part of Mr. Siggard. 
There is no evidence that the failure to take water to the property was solely his fault. 
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Messrs. Earl and Lang chose, in Mr. Earl's words, to "act upon the contract rather 
than the water" because of "gray areas"—non water problems—that had arisen between the 
parties in the years after the contracts were entered into. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 
86.) 
Messrs. Earl and Lang knew their payments on the three contracts would go through 
escrow accounts to the Prescotts (Mr. Siggard's sellers) and that nonpayment would "have an 
effect on Mr. Prescott's eventually getting his payment. * * * There was a discussion 
somewhere along the line that [Mr. Siggard] was going to have to borrow the money to pay 
[the Prescotts] * * *." (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 31, 33, 72-73.) 
When Messrs. Earl and Lang decided to withhold the annual payment of $6,000 due 
on the first contract in July 1989, their purpose was to bring financial pressure to bear on 
Mr. Siggard or, in the words of Mr. Lang, to obtain "leverage" over Mr. Siggard—to "focus 
his mind on the problem"—and to force him to agree to adjust the contract balance on the 
three contracts to reflect a credit due them of $600 per acre calculated from 1982. 
(Deposition of William R. Lang, pp. 16-19.) 
The remaining principal balances on the contracts as written are approximately 
$85,000 in all. The district court reduced the purchase price of each contract and then 
recalculated the interest owing on each as of 1982, leaving a total remaining balance on the 
three contracts of $43,035.16 in all. 
Release of the three parcels by the Prescotts 
The Prescott contract, entered into in 1977, provides for releases as follows (R. 265, 
268): 
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15. It is understood that a reasonable release of property shall 
be considered by the Sellers. However, in no event will any release be 
granted which would jeopardize the rights of the Sellers, nor shall any 
property be released prior to December 1981. 
Messrs. Earl and Lang knew of the Prescott contract when the parties three contracts 
were entered into. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 13.) As to releases, the first contract 
(20 acres) contains the following sentence (R. 259): 
2. * * * Partial releases may be granted in fourth year 
after the date hereon. 
The second contract (20 acres) contains nothing regarding releases. (R. 261.) 
The third contract (10 acres) contains only the following sentence relating to releases 
(R. 263): 
3. * * * It is provided in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract that partial releases of land may be granted in the 
fourth year after date of said Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Each of the parties' three contracts (R. 259, 261, 263) expressly acknowledges that 
there is an obligation against the property in the form of the Prescott contract. (1 6.) Each 
contract obligates Messrs. Earl and Lang as the buyers to assume and pay any penalty which 
may be required on prepayment of prior obligations. (19.) Each contract provides for the 
delivery of title subject to encumbrances mentioned. The Prescott contract is the 
encumbrance mentioned in the contracts. (119.) 
Mr. Earl obtained a release from the Prescotts in 1983 when he paid in full for the 10 
acre parcel under the fourth contract (not involved in this lawsuit). The Prescotts have also 
given releases to two other buyers from Mr. Siggard. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard (R. 
255).) 
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No evidence was presented that the Prescotts will not release the three parcels upon 
payment to the Prescotts of the amounts due on the three contracts as written. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
Summary judgment should have been entered for Mr. Siggard, as the moving party, 
when Messrs. Earl and Lang failed to support with facts the essential elements of their 
case—the existence of an agreement to provide water whenever they directed, and the 
existence of any damage. They failed to establish that there was a genuine issue for trial. 
II 
There are several reasons why the stipulations in the contracts for liquidated damages, 
if water should not be provided within a time certain, should not have been applied in this 
case: 
(1) The parties had agreed, before the time to provide water had arrived, to extend 
the date and then had agreed to postpone the delivery of water until it should actually be 
needed. This agreement of the parties effectively eliminated the stipulation for liquidated 
damages from the contracts. 
(2) There was no actual need for water in 1989 or at any time. 
(3) The only thing Mr. Siggard failed to do in 1989 was to build the distribution 
system for water that Messrs. Earl and Lang chose to insist upon without first obtaining Mr. 
Siggard's agreement. Messrs. Earl and Lang have suffered no damage. 
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Ill 
The judgment's provision that Mr. Siggard must secure a release of the three parcels 
from the Prescott contract is contrary to the provisions of the three contracts—the parties 
having contracted with knowledge of and expressly subject to the Prescott contract. The 
district judge who heard and decided the case ordered that a deed from Mr. Siggard be 
subject to the Prescott contract. The judgment signed by the successor judge did not include 
that provision. 
ARGUMENT 
We will first address the standard of Rules 56(c) and (e), U.R.Civ.P., as they apply 
in a case where parties fail to establish the existence of the essential elements of their case. 
We will then address the question whether Mr. Siggard is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
I 
MR. SIGGARD'S MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, 
ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD OF RULE 56, U.R.CIV.P. 
The essential elements of the case of Messrs. Earl and Lang, the elements on which 
they would bear the burden of proof at trial, are the existence of an agreement to the effect 
that water was to be provided to the three parcels whenever Messrs. Earl and Lang should 
direct and that they suffered damage. No evidence of such an agreement or of damage was 
provided by them either in support of their own motion or in response to Mr. Siggard's cross 
motion. 
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The essential elements of Mr. Siggard's case are that the parties' agreement was 
modified in 1983 to the effect that water would be provided thereafter when actually needed 
and that there was no need for water in 1989. Mr. Siggard stated his position by deposition 
and affidavit; the position is supported by the parties' correspondence which all parties accept 
as authentic. Messrs. Earl and Lang, in spite of every opportunity to do so, and being under 
no pressure of time, did not contradict that position even with affidavits of their own. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment should be rendered 
forthwith: 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The purpose of Rule 56 is to pierce the pleadings in order to determine whether there 
is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder and, where there is not such an issue, to 
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when it is clear, as a matter of law, that the 
party ruled against is not entitled to prevail. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 
692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 
2d 265, 106 S Ct. 2548 (1986) (Rule 56 should be construed with due regard for the rights of 
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis). 
The view of the Supreme Court of the United States on the application of Rules 56(c) 
and 56(e) in a case where a factual basis is not provided for a claim, is found in Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273 and 274 (1986): 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry 
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of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial. 
* * * 
Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond 
the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate 
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
This has been the law in Utah for some time. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1982) (a party may be granted summary judgment where the opposing party submits no 
documents in opposition and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment). The 
abundance of time and the briefing opportunities—with both parties filing supporting 
memoranda and reply memoranda—has served in this case to isolate and to dispose of, as 
being factually unsupported, the claim of an agreement that water would be provided 
whenever directed by Messrs. Earl and Lang and the claim of damages. 
II 
THIS IS NOT A CASE FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
A. The contracts were modified to eliminate the requirement that water be provided 
before it was needed:—In recalculating the remaining balances of the contracts as of 1982, 
the district court accepted the premise, stated in the first full sentence on page 2 of the Earl 
and Lang memorandum filed in the district court, that there was a series of promises to 
provide culinary water when directed by Messrs. Earl and Lang (R. 235, 236): 
In return for a series of promises to furnish culinary 
water when directed by defendants, defendants extended the time 
for Siggard to furnish culinary water to the subject properties. 
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Unfortunately, the district court overlooked or ignored the fact that there is nothing in 
the record, apart from counsel's statement, to support such a premise. The uncontradicted 
record shows that what the parties actually did was to modify their contracts with respect to 
the time for delivering water. 
The parties modified their contracts on two occasions. The first was in 1982 when 
they agreed to extend to 1983 the time for providing water. The following statement from 
Mr. Siggard's first affidavit states the reason why water was not provided in 1982 (^ 2 (R. 
255)): 
In 1982, before I was to provide water to the three lots 
purchased by Parker Earl and William Lang, they had no need 
for water at their lots and told me that they would rather have 
water delivered in the future than have a reduction of the 
purchase price of the lots. The time for providing water was 
extended and the letter to me dated in December 1982 confirmed 
our agreement. 
Mr. Siggard's affidavit is the sole evidence of the reason for water not being provided 
in 1982. Mr. Siggard has stated, without contradiction, that the parties agreed, before water 
was to be provided in 1982, to extend the time to 1983 and later confirmed this by letter. 
Thus, there was no default in 1982. 
The second modification of the parties' contracts occurred in 1983 when the parties 
agreed that water would be provided thereafter when "actually needed." (See the confirming 
letters of December 10, 1982, July 1, 1987, July 8, 1987, and June 6, 1988, discussed above 
at pages 5-6 (R. 278, 279).) There is no evidence in the record to the contrary. 
Parties may change their views and the requirements of their agreement as to time of 
performance. Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1988). 
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As stated in Maryland Steel Co. v. United States, 235 U.S. 451, 35 S. Ct. 190, 192 (1915): 
Undoubtedly parties may agree that time shall be of the essence 
of their contract, and, the proper legal conditions existing, may 
stipulate for damages and the measure of them, but they may 
subsequently change their views and requirements, and consider 
that performance within the stipulated time is unimportant. 
The contracts having been modified, "the terms thereof prevail over inconsistent terms 
in the original contract in governing the rights and obligations of the parties." Ted R. Brown 
and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., supra, 753 P. 2d at 968 (Utah App. 1988). 
B. The stipulation for liquidated damages was eliminated from the 
contracts:—Messrs. Earl and Lang are trying to do in this case what the federal government 
could not do in Maryland Steel Co., quoted from above,—to obtain the benefits of a 
stipulation for liquidated damages after the time for performance had been waived. The 
government was successful in the United States Court of Claims but the United States 
Supreme Court reversed. 
The facts of Maryland Steel Co., are remarkably similar to those of the present case. 
Briefly, the facts of that case are as follows: (1) the contract provided a time for completion 
and a stipulation for liquidated damages for delay; (2) the government had the right to annul 
the contract upon default of the steel company, but preferred to retain the contract and extend 
the time of its execution; (3) the time limit was orally waived and subsequently confirmed by 
letter; (4) there was no unreasonable delay of the work after the waiver of the time limit; (5) 
there was no actual pecuniary loss or damage by reason of the delay; and (6) there was no 
culpable delinquency on the part of the steel company. 
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the parties' stipulation as to time of 
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performance, of which the liquidated damages was a part, was waived and by being waived 
the liquidated damages stipulation was eliminated trom the contract. 
If Messrs. Earl and Lang's expectations were frustrated in 1989, they may seek 
recovery from Mr. Siggard only for a breach by him of the parties' contracts as modified. 
Any pre-modification contractual rights to the contrary "must be deemed waived or excused." 
Rapp v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189 (U. 1980). As this Court stated 
(606P.2dat 1192): 
Our only concern is whether either party breached the 
contract by failing to perform according to its terms as modified, 
C. No water was needed in 1989:—The question whether Mr. Siggard was required, 
to provide water to the parcels by July 1, 1989 should have been decided in the light of these 
uncontradicted facts: (1) Mr. Siggard had demonstrated his good faith and the availability of 
water by bringing in a successful water well in 1983; (2) the parties recognized a "potential 
of damage to the well of going any further with the delivery of water * * * before the water 
could be put to use;" (3) the parties agreed that water should be provided in the future when 
"actually needed;" and (4) there was no actual need for water because the Earl and Lang sale 
of the third parcel to the Clarks fell through when the Clarks' were divorced. (R. 278, 279; 
deposition of W. Parker Earl, pages 18-19, 29, 39.) 
The parties' decision to wait until there should be an actual need for water was a wise 
one. "Public policy and common sense oppose the waste of installing a culinary water line to 
serve land which, for all that appears, will remain unused." Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 
549 (Utah.App. 1989). 
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The trial court in the Bell case (quoting from the opinion of the court of appeals (782 
P.2d at 546): 
saw no purpose in requiring installation of culinary water 
facilities to serve rather remote property not intended for 
residential use, and held that the Elders were required by the 
contract to be merely able to furnish water to the subject 
property by October 15, 1980, and that they were required to 
actually furnish the water to the property only if the Bells had 
obtained a building permit and were about to construct a house, 
so that the water would be put to "beneficial use." 
The Bell case stands for the principle, among others, that where there is no need for 
water at the property, the promisor is only required to be able to furnish culinary water to the 
property when needed. 782 P.2d at 546-547. The principle of the Bell case is what the 
parties in this case actually agreed to in 1983 and confirmed in writing in 1987—that water 
should be provided when actually needed. 
When Mr. Siggard agreed by letter of June 23, 1988, to provide water by July 1, 
1989 (R. 212) it was in response to an express representation of Messrs. Earl and Lang in 
their letter of June 6, 1988, that there was a "specific need" for water on the 10 acre parcel 
they had contracted to sell to the Clarks (R. 280). But that need evaporated with the Clarks" 
marriage. Messrs. Earl and Lang had also learned in 1989 that the three parcels probably 
could not be subdivided and they had decided that the parcels could be sold without water. 
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 55, 63-64.) 
There is no evidence of the existence of an actual need for water on any of the parcels 
at any time. There is also no evidence that the parties further agreed that water should be 
provided, "contrary to public policy and common sense," Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d at 549, in 
the absence of an actual need for water. 
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We respectfully submit that without evidence of actual need for water at the three 
parcels, Mr. Siggard was not in breach of the parties' modified agreement in 1989. Thus, 
there was no default so far as providing needed water was concerned in 1989. 
D. There was no agreement on the water delivery system demanded by Messrs. Earl 
and Lang in 1989:—The actual dispute in 1988-89 was not over the availability of water, but 
over the size and location of the water delivery system. (R. 280.) 
The water system Messrs. Earl and Lang deemed necessary required a quantity of 
water, based upon the number of families anticipated, and a location of distribution lines 
which were not agreed upon in 1978. The "criteria" and "conditions" were not presented to 
Mr. Siggard in 1988 and 1999 as subjects for negotiation to correct an omission of the 
parties' in their preparation of the original contracts. Rather, the water system was presented 
as something without which Messrs. Earl and Lang would not accept a delivery of water. 
Their letter of June 6, 1988, made the point as follows (R. 280): 
For clarification, if you choose to bring the water, the following criteria 
are necessary for us to accept the delivery of water as provided in the 
contract: 
Their letter of March 1, 1989, was just as specific (R. 281): 
In order to accept culinary water in lieu of the reduction of $600/acre 
on our 60 acres as per the contracts between us, we will require that the 
following conditions be met: 
What Messrs. Earl and Lang did, in effect, although none of the parties appears to 
have been aware of it, was to signal an anticipatory repudiation—a species of breach—of the 
contracts; a positive and unequivocal manifestation that they would insist upon terms which 
were not in the three contracts. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 681 P.2d 
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390, 429-434 (Ariz. App. 1983). 
The insistence of Messrs. Earl and Lang, could not obligate Mr. Siggard, without his 
prior agreement, to provide a water delivery system according to their specifications. 
E. Messrs. Earl and Lang caused or contributed to the delay in putting in a delivery 
system and they suffered no damage:—Although Mr. Siggard's work on a delivery system had 
been "aggressive" in June 1989, he received oral and written instructions to "not install the 
pipe before we all review your plans." (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 89, 42, 48, 49, 
91, 93-94 (R. 283).) 
What was Mr. Siggard to do when faced with a demand to perform according to terms 
not agreed upon, followed by an order not to install the pipe? He said that he would have 
taken water to the three parcels but for the letter of June 12, 1989. (Second affidavit of 
Richard Siggard (R. 292).) His affidavit is not contradicted. 
There is no evidence that the failure to have the Earl and Lang water system in place 
was solely Mr. Siggard's fault. There is no evidence that the Earl and Lang instructions to 
"not install the pipe" were not sufficient to account for any failure to meet their July 1, 1989, 
deadline for a delivery system. 
One who causes a delay cannot avail himself of that delay, Cannon v. Steven School, 
560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). Such a one is not entitled to recover for a resulting failure to 
meet a completion date, even under a stipulation for liquidated damages. Higgins v. City of 
Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah 1981). 
We submit that it was not unreasonable for Mr. Siggard to have stopped his work and 
that the district court should have viewed Messrs. Earl and Lang as the parties who caused 
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the work to stop. 
If Messrs. Earl and Lang were not the sole cause of the work stopping, they at least 
contributed to that stoppage, according to the uncontradicted affidavit of Mr. Siggard, when 
they gave the oral and written instructions to "not install the pipe" and chose to not comment 
upon the drawings sent them by Mr. Siggard's letter of July 11, 1989. (Second affidavit of 
Richard Siggard (R. 292); deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 42, 48, 49, 91, 93-94.) 
One who contributes to delay is precluded from obtaining liquidated damages for the 
delay. Higgins v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192, 193, fn. 2 (Utah 1981); Peter Kiewit 
Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Jr. Col Dist., 379 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1963). 
The stipulation for liquidated damages in the three contracts could have been 
considered appropriate in 1978 as a reasonable forecast of just compensation for possible 
actual damage to be sustained in the future, if water should not be available when needed. 
Such damages would be essentially compensatory in nature. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 
(Utah 1982). But in 1989, the well having been completed, and there being no need for 
water, and there being no evidence of damage sustained, the liquidated damages were out of 
all proportion to reality. See Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985). 
Ill 
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACTS 
SUBJECT TO THE PRESCOTT CONTRACT 
The part of the district court's judgment, entered July 9, 1991 (R. 315), directing Mr. 
Siggard to obtain releases of the three parcels from the obligations of the Prescott contract 
(R. 265), is contrary to the provisions of the parties three contracts which were entered into 
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with knowledge of the Prescott contract (R. 259, 261, 263; deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 
14). 
The Prescott contract contains the following provision as to releases (R. 268): 
15. It is understood that a reasonable release of property shall be 
considered by the Sellers. However, in no event will any release be granted 
which would jeopardize the rights of the Sellers, nor shall any property be 
released prior to December 1981. 
There is nothing in the parties' first contract that requires Mr. Siggard to obtain a 
release from the Prescott contract. The first contract speaks only of partial releases from the 
20 acre parcel it covers and no such releases have been requested (R. 259): 
2. * * * Partial releases may be granted in fourth year 
after the date hereon. 
The second contract, also for 20 acres, says nothinig of releases. (R. 261.) 
There is nothing said in the parties' third contract, for 10 acres, about Mr. Siggard 
obtaining a release from the Prescott contract (R. 263): 
3. * * * It is provided in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract that partial releases of land may be granted in the 
fourth year after date of said Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
In addition, each of the three contracts acknowledges the obligation of the Prescott 
contract and expressly provides for the delivery of a deed conveying title subject to the 
encumbrance of the Prescott contract. (See 11 6 and 19 (R. 259, 261, 263).) 
The district judge who heard and decided the case (Noel) ordered that a deed from 
Mr. Siggard would be subject to the Prescott contract. (See the Minute Entry for June 3, 
1991 (R. 300).) The judgment submitted to the successor district judge (Wilkinson) and 
signed by him did not contain that provision but, instead, requires Mr. Siggard to obtain 
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releases from the Prescotts. (R. 315.) 
The judgment's requirement that releases be obtained from the Prescotts cannot be 
supported on the record. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed and 
the case remanded with directions that Mr. Siggard's motion for partial summary judgment be 
granted; that the motion of Messrs. Earl and Lang be denied; that Mr. Siggard have judgment 
that the price of each contract is not to be reduced for nondelivery of water in 1989 and that 
he is not obligated to secure releases of the three parcels from the Prescotts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Claron C. Spencer 
SPENCER & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for appellant Richard Siggard 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, certify that on October , 1991, I served four copies of the foregoing brief by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
R. Scott Howell, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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R. SCOTT HOWELL (A4056) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD SIGGARD, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
VS. 
W. PARKER EARL, BETTY ANN 
EARL, WILLIAM R. LANG and Civil No. 10530 
SUSAN L. LANG, 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for 
hearing and decision before the above-entitled court on June 3, 
1991. Plaintiff appeared by and through his counsel, claron 
Spencer of Spencer and Anderson. Defendants appeared by and 
through their counsel, R. Scott Howell of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Upon stipulation of counsel, the Court ordered that 
the depositions of William Lang, Parker Earl and Richard Siggard 
be published. Plaintiff seeks an order of foreclosure of certain 
real property covered by a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Defendants seek specific performance of three Uniform Real Estate 
NO. 
F I L E D 
M. 9 }99f 




mw i PACF0"5? 
Contracts. The Court reviewed the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and memoranda on file, and heard oral argument of 
counsel for both parties. 
The Court finds persuasive the argument of defendants as set 
forth in Points I, II & III of their Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons and upon the bases 
therein stated summary judgment in favor of defendants is 
appropriate. 
As prevailing party in this lawsuit, defendants are entitled 
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Attorneys1 fees 
and costs in the amount of $12,500.00 have been substantiated by 
the Affidavit of R. Scott Howell, and the court finds such fees 
and costs reasonable. This amount has not been contested by 
plaintiff either in his motions and memoranda or at the hearing 
that took place on June 3, 1991. 
It appearing that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact precluding the entry of summary judgment and that defendants 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
2. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
specific performance under the three Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts is ordered as follows: 
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A. The total amount owing by defendants to plaintiff 
as of July 10, 1990 under the three Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
is £40,374.38 calculated as follows: 
(1) Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on September 
5, 1978, covering real property identified in the first paragraph 
of Exhibit "A" hereto: 
Principal $27,964.51 
Interest at the contract 
rate of 8.5% through July 10, 1990 $ 4,956.01 
Total $32,920.52 
(2) Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on December 
27, 1978, covering real property identified in the second 
paragraph of the Exhibit "A" hereto: 
Principal $ 936.03 
Interest at the contract rate of 
8.5% through July 10, 1990 $ 79.56 
Total $1,015.60 
(3) Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on December 
27, 1978, covering real property identified in the third 
paragraph of Exhibit "A" hereto: 
Principal $5 , 933.88 
Interest at the contract rate of 
8.5% per annum through July 10, 1990 $ 504.38 
Total $6,438.26 
Defendants are awarded their attorneys1 fees and costs of 
$12,500.00, which shall be offset against the amounts owed on the 
contracts, leaving a balance owed as of June 3, 1991, on the 
three contracts calculated as follows: 
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Total owed as of July 10, 1990 $40,374.38 
Interest on principal ($34,834.42) 
from 7/10/90 to 6/3/91 @ 8.5% 2,660.78 
Principal and interest as of 6/3/91 $43,035.16 
Less Attorneys' Fees and Costs (12,500.00) 
Balance owed as of 6/3/91 $30,535.16 
Per diem interest = $7.11 
B. Defendants shall, within fifteen (15) days of the 
date this order shall be entered by the Court, deliver into the 
registry of this court, a certified check made payable to the 
clerk of this court, in the amount as provided in paragraph (2) 
above. Upon delivery of such sums to the clerk of the court, the 
obligations of defendants shall cease accruing interest. 
C. Within thirty (30) days after delivery by 
defendants of such sums to the court in the manner stated in 
paragraph (2)(B) above, plaintiff shall secure releases of all 
liens and encumbrances created by, or arising through, plaintiff 
including all right, title, interest and claim currently held by 
Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Prescott in the subject properties under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract that predates the contracts entered 
into by and between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff shall 
also, and within the thirty (30) day period, deliver unto 
defendants warranty deeds to each of the properties covered by 
the three contracts and shall also deliver to defendants all 
other property including irrigation water rights which plaintiff 
agreed to deliver to defendants under the terms of the three 
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contracts. Upon written stipulation by defendants that plaintiff 
has performed hereunder, the Court will enter an order directing 
the clerk of the court to turn over to plaintiff all of the funds 
delivered by defendants into court together with interest, if 
any, that has accrued thereon. In the event of objections by 
defendants to plaintiff's performance, such objections shall be 
promptly filed with the court and set for hearing. 
3. The award of attorneys' fees provided herein may be 
augmented by supplemental affidavit of additional attorneys' fees 
and costs as are reasonably incurred by defendants in pursuing 
and obtaining the relief herein adjudicated. 
DATED this a day of / \/&*~s\ ^- , 1991 
BY 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Judge J^a 
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The North one-half of the NW1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 28, 
T2S, R6E, SLBM containing 20 acres more or less together with 
one-half of the mineral rights and a proportionate share of the 
irrigation water rights of the former WAYNE PRESCOTT DAIRY RANCH. 
Paragraph 2 
Beginning at a point 990.00 feet North of the Southeast 
corner of Section 21, in Township 2 South of Range 6 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 330.0 feet, 
more or less, to a fence line; thence West 1230 feet, more or 
less, to the fence line on the East bank of the Beaver and 
Shingle Creek Irrigation Company canal; thence Southwesterly 
along a fence line to a point directly West of the point of 
beginning; thence East 1360 feet, more or less, to the point of 
beginning. 
Paragraph 3 
Beginning at a point 330 feet South of the center of the 
intersection of Page Lane and East Loop Road between Kamas and 
Francis-Woodland being 1320 feet West and 330.0 feet South of the 
Northeast corner of Section 28, in Township 2 South of Range 6 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running then East 
500.00 feet; thence South 45°00' East 212.1 feet; thence East 
440.0 feet; thence South 840 feet; more or less, to fence line; 
thence West to the center of the Kamas-Francis Woodland Road; 
thence Northwesterly along the center line of said road to the 
place of beginning. Area 20.00 acres, more or less. 
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